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7 FEBRUARY 1982**"MISSING"****New Film by
Costa-Gavras
Examines the
Chilean Coup**

By FLORA LEWIS

Fact: A young American freelance writer named Charles Horman was killed during the 1973 coup that brought the Pinochet regime to power in Chile.

Fact: His father, a New York industrial designer, was told that his son was missing and went to Chile in what became a desperate search to find Charles. Edmund C. Horman, the father, gradually became convinced that the American Embassy in Santiago not only knew about the murder from the start but was intent on concealing it because it shared responsibility. He later sued 11 high United States officials for \$4 million, but after a year and a half the case was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Fact: A lawyer named Thomas Hauser was drawn into the Horman family's crusade and wrote a book about the incident called "The Execution of Charles Horman: An American Sacrifice," published in 1979.

Fact: Costa-Gavras, the Paris-based Greek director who made powerful political films about cases in Greece, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay, accepted an offer from Universal to make a movie from the Hauser book. It is called "Missing," stars Jack Lemmon and Sissy Spacek and it opens in New York on Friday at the Beekman theater. It is tautly well-made and cinematically convincing.

Fiction: "This film is based on a true story. The incidents and facts are documented. Some of the names have been changed to protect the innocent and also to protect the film."

This message is shown at the start of the film. In many cases real names are used, real events are evoked, real encounters portrayed. These devices and the director's art are combined to persuade the viewer to accept the story and its charge that the United States helped plan the coup in Chile and sanctioned the murder of Charles

But it isn't a documentary, and in the course of an interview Mr. Costa-Gavras didn't pretend that it is. "Don't ask a film director to be a political technician," he said after a showing here. "Either you give two points of view, or you say, 'Here's what I think. I draw my own conclusion.'"

That is the problem. The film gives only one point of view, essentially Ed Horman's, but its claim to present a basic historical truth puts it in a different category from other dramatizations and political thrillers. It is a technique which raises serious ethical, moral and political as well as artistic questions.

Mr. Costa-Gavras says he collaborated closely with the author of the book and spent a good deal of time with the Horman family "so I could reproduce them." But he made no effort to speak with the government officials he portrays nor to consult the records, particularly of the Senate Intelligence Committee headed by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, which made extensive investigations and issued a report on "Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973."

"The director can't do everything," he said. "Hauser did the research and saw all those people, and I went through all his notes."

The difficulty is that the role of the United States in Chile remains an extremely controversial, emotional subject. A good deal has been made public and it documents some nasty episodes. When Salvador Allende's regime was overturned by Gen. Augusto Pinochet in a vast, murderous rampage, many people, particularly French Socialists, felt it showed the United States would go to any length to prevent the survival of another leftist government besides Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. The French left identified their own aims with Allende. The coup became a kind of litmus test for the Paris intelligentsia, a sequel to the Vietnam war.

Newspaper reports, especially those of Seymour M. Hersh in The New York Times, and lengthy records of the Church Committee in 1975 and 1976 showed that the United States had indeed been involved in Chilean politics. The most damaging evidence related to C.I.A. activity attempting to prevent Allende's election in 1970. At that time, it was revealed, an infamous operation called "Track II" linked American agents with violent right-wing groups.

Ed Horman was being powerful enough to lengthen the list of Mr. Horman's conclusions. He was the Secretary of Defense (then Melvin Laird). It was an extraordinary meeting.

Nonetheless, Allende was elected. After that, according to the Church Committee and statements by Nathaniel Davis, who was Ambassador in Santiago from 1971 until shortly after the 1973 coup, the United States channeled funds to political parties, press and radio stations in Chile but stayed away from violent right wingers and military plots.

The thesis, Mr. Davis wrote in the Foreign Service Journal in 1978, was that the Allende Government was putting such intense pressure on the opposition's capacity to survive that it might be unable to contest the next election scheduled for 1976. The secret subsidies, he said, were to enable opposition parties and distributors of information to compete with Government-supported parties and press.

"We still have not, as a society, thought through the practical and ethical implications of covert action," Mr. Davis said. He pointed out, and the record confirms, that he successfully opposed C.I.A. suggestions to support strikes and demonstrations to undermine Allende.

However, Richard Helms and Hal Hendrix, an I.T.T. official, were convicted of perjury for their testimony before a 1973 Senate committee on what happened in 1970. And there was the extraordinary Nixon order to Helms not to inform Ambassador Korry and two top cabinet members of that plot. Credibility became a serious issue in disentangling the Chile story.

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STATINTL

Former CIA chief defends agency's role

By Barbara Bernstein
Deseret News correspondent

OGDEN — Ever since Moses sent spies to the land of Canaan, intelligence-gathering has been an intriguing function, but the profession has changed since America got serious about it, according to William Colby, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Colby spoke at a noon convocation Thursday at Weber State College, sponsored by the Associated Students in conjunction with Social Science Week. It was Colby's second visit to the Ogden school.

Colby said the change in American espionage began 40 years ago when the country was surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It shouldn't have been surprised, he said, because there intelligence abounded pointing to the intentions and capabilities of the Japanese, but the information was not consolidated.

"We decided to find out what we already knew and centralize it," he said. The government solicited information from universities, geographical societies, tourists and commercial travelers, and asked experts in the Central Intelligence Agency to analyze the data.

Even such a trivial thing as a photo of somebody's Aunt Minnie on a beach in a bathing suit was put to use, he said. If experts noted that she was standing by a truck, for example, they would know the beach was firm enough for military or espionage vehicles.

The progress of technology has brought a change in American espionage too, Colby said. The observation planes that flew over Russia for 3½ years were not an exercise in idle curiosity. Eventually they flew over Cuba and detected the shape of Soviet armaments being constructed there.

Technology bought the United States the time to confront Khrushchev before he had his weapons finished and pointed at the U.S.

With technological help, the United States has gone into space and under the ocean to keep watch on other countries' activities, Colby said, and literally listens to the rumbling of the earth's crust to detect their atomic tests.

With the changed scope and accuracy of knowledge-gathering, he said, the United States no longer has to send an individual spy slinking out of Hong Kong to see what the Chinese are doing on their borders. "We can see and hear them from here."

Another change in intelligence operation is recent insistence that American spies operate under the Constitution and laws, Colby said. Formerly, spies were considered outside the law, and even President Dwight D. Eisenhower said spies have to be permitted to do their own work in their own way.

After Watergate, the public engaged in recrimination and hysteria about the CIA, Colby said, exaggerating instances where the agency did the wrong thing and ignoring the good it has done.

"We are sobering up now after our binge," he said. "We have resolved the contradiction, and we are going to run our intelligence agency under the Constitution." He said the CIA now has a public document issued by the president that delineates what the CIA is empowered to do and sets up a system of accountability. Congress even has two committees to see that the intelligence service keeps within its bounds.

"We still have to turn to the spy, to brave Americans and brave foreigners, to bring us information," Colby said, because the world is still not safe for democracy. Other countries, comparatively underprivileged, see American prosperity and seek tools to bridge the difference between them and the United States. The tools they use might be economic and political, or they might be sabotage and violence, he said.

Great power is now available in small packages — chemical, nuclear and biological — he said, and this power can easily come into the hands of despots.

But U.S. information systems can discover problems and defend against threats. It can even deter the use of threats against the United States and its allies by buying time. The United States can now lay information on the negotiating table and deal from strong and informed positions, Colby said.

Tilting at Windmills

When the Washington Post bought the printing plant of the Washington Star, it had a legitimate reason: *Post* circulation had skyrocketed because of the *Star's* demise. But the purchase also effectively cut off the possibility of a new afternoon paper published by anyone other than the Post. There is simply not the existing press availability to print such a paper, and the capital investment to buy new presses, considering the generally dim prospects for afternoon papers, is just too forbidding. . . .

Remember how clever criminals once wore gloves or carefully erased their fingerprints before leaving the scene of a crime? These precautions are no longer necessary. You can leave prints all over the place and still have two months to escape to Rio or some other haven and commit a few more burglaries before you leave. The reason is it's now taking the FBI that long to process requests for fingerprint checks. . . .

The Reagan administration has extorted \$10,000 from William Colby by threatening him with prosecution because his French publisher had distributed copies of his book containing certain "sensitive passages" that were deleted at the CIA's request in the American edition. It was this magazine that first pointed out the differences ["Le Couvert Blown," by Joseph Nocera, November 1980] between the French and American editions. Our point was that the agency's cuts—the so-called sensitive passages—concerned insignificant matters and proved how idiotic the CIA's censorship was. The fine is a shameful reversion to Nixonism.

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The Reagan administration is giving us another appointee in the great tradition of Allen, Raymond Donovan, and William J. ("not unfit") Casey. He is Maurice Stans, who has been nominated to be director of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Stans, you will recall, served as finance chairman of the Committee to Reelect the President and raised a record \$62 million for the 1972 campaign. Unfortunately, the way he raised and disbursed the money led to his indictment by two grand juries. On March 12, 1975, he pleaded guilty to three counts of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act and two counts of accepting illegal campaign contributions. . . .

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How to Retire at 45

In the CIA, says Ralph McGehee all
you have to do is tell the truth.

STATINTL

Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after he was cut from the Green Bay Packers. He's not sure why the CIA approached him, but during his intelligence training he met so many other pro football dropouts that he suspects the agency considered the National Football League a prime recruiting ground.

When the Korean War ended in 1953 McGehee joined the agency's clandestine operations section as a case officer. Over the next two decades he served in the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam. He did the routine work of an intelligence officer: recruiting agents, conducting investigations, and maintaining liaison with the local police and intelligence organizations.

During that era the CIA's main struggle was against Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia. That

struggle was a losing one. Of all the countries in the region, today only Thailand remains allied to the West. McGehee thinks he knows why our side lost the rest.

In 1965 McGehee directed an intelligence gathering effort in a province in northeast Thailand where a Communist insurgency was beginning. After a detailed, yearlong study, McGehee reported that he had found a popular movement so broad, pervasive and deeply rooted that purely military measures were unlikely to defeat it.

McGehee submitted his findings to the agency but, after a brief period of praise for this work, he ran into an official wall in Washington.

His findings, he explains, ran counter to the official Washington view that Communist insurgency was a form of clandestine invasion, and that the natives involved were unwilling participants who were duped or forced into joining guerilla units who took their arms and orders from outside.

McGehee maintains that intelligence

information often is politicized. In theory, the agency provides accurate and unbiased information to the President so he can make wise decisions regarding national security. In practice, when a President is firmly committed to a particular policy (such as military victory in Vietnam), the agency shapes its information to conform to that policy. Bad or even inconvenient news is unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in the history of intelligence, and it is the rock on which Ralph McGehee foundered.

After he submitted his dissenting report, McGehee's career took a nose-dive. He was shuttled from one low-level job to another. He was promised promotions but never received them.

He was frustrated as he watched his country wage the wrong kind of war in Southeast Asia, one he knew was doomed to failure. He did what he could

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